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Abstract	
Existing	approaches	to	cyber	security	and	regulation	in	the	automotive	sector	cannot	achieve	
the	quality	of	outcome	necessary	 to	ensure	the	safe	mass	deployment	of	advanced	vehicle	
technologies	and	smart	mobility	 systems.	Without	sustainable	 resilience	hard-fought	public	
trust	will	evaporate,	derailing	emerging	global	initiatives	to	improve	the	efficiency,	safety	and	
environmental	 impact	 of	 future	 transport.	 This	 paper	 introduces	 an	 operational	 cyber	
resilience	methodology,	CyRes,	 that	 is	suitable	 for	standardisation.	The	CyRes	methodology	
itself	is	capable	of	being	tested	in	court	or	by	publicly	appointed	regulators.	It	is	designed	so	
that	operators	understand	what	evidence	should	be	produced	by	it	and	are	able	to	measure	
the	quality	of	that	evidence.	The	evidence	produced	is	capable	of	being	tested	in	court	or	by	
publicly	appointed	regulators.	Thus,	the	real-world	system	to	which	the	CyRes	methodology	
has	 been	 applied	 is	 capable	 of	 operating	 at	 all	 times	 and	 in	 all	 places	 with	 a	 legally	 and	
socially	acceptable	value	of	negative	consequence.	
	
1.	Introduction	
The	 rapid	 digitisation	 of	 automotive	 vehicles	 and	 infrastructure,	 designed	 to	 realise	 the	
potential	of	Connected	and	Autonomous	Vehicles	(CAVs),	has	vastly	increased	the	probability	
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of	 catastrophic	 and	 unrecoverable	 failure1.	 Current	 and	 pending	 regulations	 and	 legal	
infrastructure,	 together	with	 technical	methodologies	developed	over	 the	past	50	years,	or	
borrowed	 from	 the	 IT	 sector,	 are	 contributing	 to	 the	 issue,	 rather	 than	 mitigating	 it.	 For	
example,	 existing	 maturity	 models	 initially	 developed	 to	 drive	 policy	 implementation	 and	
process	 assessment,	 fail	 to	 capture	 all	 resilience	 lines	 of	 effort	 adequately,	 due	 to	 the	
complexity	and	size	of	the	vehicular	cyberinfrastructure2.		
Over	the	 long	term,	existing	approaches	to	cyber	security	and	regulation	 in	the	automotive	
sector	cannot	achieve	the	quality	of	outcome	necessary	to	ensure	the	safe	mass	deployment	
of	advanced	vehicle	technologies	and	smart	mobility	systems.	Without	sustainable	resilience	
hard-fought	public	 trust	will	evaporate,	derailing	emerging	global	 initiatives	 to	 improve	 the	
efficiency,	safety	and	environmental	impact	of	future	transport.	
This	paper	introduces	an	operational	methodology,	suitable	for	standardisation,	for	which:	
1. The	methodology	 itself	 is	 capable	 of	 being	 tested	 in	 court	 or	 by	 publicly	 appointed	
regulators.	
2. Operators	 understand	 what	 evidence	 should	 be	 produced	 by	 it	 and	 are	 able	 to	
measure	the	quality	of	that	evidence.	
3. The	evidence	produced	 is	 capable	of	being	 tested	 in	 court	or	by	publicly	 appointed	
regulators.	
Typically	 this	 will	 mean	 that	 the	 real-world	 system	 to	 which	 the	 methodology	 has	 been	
applied	 is	 capable	 of	 operating	 at	 all	 times	 and	 in	 all	 places	 with	 a	 legally	 and	 socially	
acceptable	value	of	negative	consequence.	
2.	Context	
Evolution	from	traditional	automobiles	has	resulted	in	automotive	systems	that	have	become	
large-scale	ad-hoc	heterogeneous	system	of	systems	with	emergent	and	dynamic	properties	
and	for	which	the	boundaries	of	ownership,	control	and	responsibility	–	if	not	liability	–	are	
ill-defined.	 Whist	 the	 system	 has	 increased	 in	 complexity,	 individuals	 and	 organisations	
remain	obligated	to	have	robust	engineering	processes	which	must	provide,	to	the	standard	
the	law	expects,	the	type	of	evidence	that	is	required	when	justifying	the	safety,	privacy	and	
market	compliance	of	their	components,	systems	and	platforms.	
Traditionally,	 post-sale	 responsibilities	 for	 vehicle	manufacturers	 have	 been,	 principally,	 to	
provide	warnings	regarding	newly	discovered	risks.	However,	the	authors	have	demonstrated	
at	 least	 six	 classes	of	 cyber	 threat	 that	are	 inherent	and	exploitable	 in	any	 complex	 cyber-
physical	 system;	 in	 that	 context,	 and	 with	 that	 knowledge,	 the	 existing	 post-sale	
responsibilities	 represent	 a	 theoretically	 infeasible	 task.	 As	 the	 vision	 of	 connected	 and	
automated	 mobility	 (CAM)	 is	 realised,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 organisations	 to	 move	 from	
                                                
1	Maple,	C.	(2017).	Security	and	privacy	in	the	internet	of	things.	Journal	of	Cyber	Policy,	2(2),	155-184.	
2	Douglas	Gettman	et	al.	(2017).	Guidelines	for	Applying	Capability	Maturity	Model	Analysis	to	Connected	and	
Automated	Vehicle	Deployment,	ITS	Joint	Programme	Office,	U.S.	Department	of	Transport.	
2	Douglas	Gettman	et	al.	(2017).	Guidelines	for	Applying	Capability	Maturity	Model	Analysis	to	Connected	and	
Automated	Vehicle	Deployment,	ITS	Joint	Programme	Office,	U.S.	Department	of	Transport.	
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concentrating	 solely	 on	 manufacturing,	 to	 delivering	 robust	 and	 resilient	 engineering	
practices	from	manufacture	to	operation.	
The	nature	of	CAV	systems	means	 the	cyber	attack	surface	 is,	practically,	 infinite3	with	 the	
point	of	 specific	 ingress	 changing	 instantly,	 and	a	potentially	 very	high	 rate	of	propagation	
within	and	between	mobility	elements.	That	renders	it	impossible	to	simplify	cyber	incident	
analysis	with	existing	network	model	taxonomy	descriptions4.	Further,	defending	one	attack	
may,	in	fact,	guarantee	the	success	of	another,	 in	part	due	to	the	limited	collective	security	
measures	 in	place.	 So,	 for	example,	 ‘rebooting’	 a	 large	 vehicle	 fleet	 in	operation	would	be	
infeasible	and	most	likely	undesirable	in	any	case;	but	were	it	achieved	it	would	undoubtedly,	
in	 this	 less	 than	 fully-analysed	 state,	 serve	 as	 a	 vector	 for	 ingress	 of	malware.	 Traditional	
engineering	approaches,	 such	as	 the	V-model,	are	 incapable	of	addressing	such	challenges,	
and	 new	methods	 should	 be	 developed	 to	 ensure	 the	 cyber	 resilience,	 cyber	 security	 and	
cyber	safety	of	advanced	vehicles	and	infrastructure.	
3.	Cyber	Resilience	Principles	
The	authors	have	held	a	number	of	workshops	and	focus	groups	over	the	last	two	years,	to	
identify	the	key	challenges	and	to	develop	principles	and	methods	to	overcome	these.		This	
has	resulted	in	three	Principles:	
● Increase	the	probability	of	detection,	understanding	and	acting	on	cyber	events;	
● Increase	the	number	of	Engineered	Significant	Differences;	and	
● Invoke	a	continuum	of	Proactive	Updates.	
To	assess	the	efficacy	of	the	engineering	approach	and	to	provide	a	basis	of	evidence-based	
certification,	we	propose	the	following	certification	arguments:	
● Probability	of	detecting	threats	
● Probability	of	understanding	threats	
● Rate	of	deploying	mitigating	actions	
● Time	for	a	threat	to	propagate	
● Quantity	of	Engineered	Differences	
● Frequency	of	Proactive	Updates	
4.	Measuring	Resilience	
The	mission	 performance	metric,	 P(t),	 measuring	 the	 total	 performance	 of	 a	 system	 over	
time	can	be	defined	to	produce	a	value	between	0	and	1,	where	P(t)	=	0	corresponds	to	the	
system	not	 functioning	at	all	 and	P(t)	=	1	 corresponds	 to	a	 fully	 functioning	 system.	 In	our	
case,	we	can	define	the	mission	performance	metric	P(t)	as	the	average	performance	metric	
across	all	vehicles.	
                                                
3	The	Automotive	system	will	include	Satellites,	3G/4G/5G,	WiFi,	DSRC,	CV2X,	Bluetooth,	GNSS,	USB,	OBD	into	
CANbus,	and	a	range	of	other	possible	connections,	including	access	to	IoT	networks,	chipset	IP,	training	data	sets.	
4	Zeinab	El-Rewini	et	al.	(2020).	Cybersecurity	challenges	in	vehicular	communications.	Journal	of	Vehicular	
Communications,	23,	p.100214	
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We	 can	 use	 this	 performance	metric	 to	 assess	 resilience	 during	 an	 incident.	We	define	 an	
event,	E,	to	occur	over	an	interval	of	time	t	=	[0,	T],	where	time	t	=	0	represents	the	start	of	
the	 incident,	and	 t	 =	T	 is	 the	end.	The	start	of	an	event	 is	 identified	when	 for	at	 least	one	
vehicle	the	performance	metric	is	less	than	1.	The	end	of	an	event	is	determined	when	P(t)	=	
1,	 that	 is	 the	 system	 has	 fully	 recovered,	 or	 some	 value	 PA,	 where	 PA	 is	 a	 level	 deemed	
acceptable	by	regulation.	Figure	2	illustrates	an	example	of	a	performance	metric	during	an	
event.	
	
Figure	2:	System	performance	over	an	event	
In	this	example,	the	performance	decreases	in	stages.	For	a	short	period	of	time	t=to,	it	falls	
below	 a	 threshold	 which	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 minimum	 performance	 required	 for	 the	
system	 to	 be	 useful.	 To	 limit	 the	 amount	 of	 time	 the	 system	 spends	 in	 this	 state,	 the	
manufacturer	issues	an	initial	response	which	provides	a	partial	recovery.	Towards	the	end	of	
the	 event,	 the	manufacturer	 issues	 a	 permanent	 fix	 and	 the	 system	 returns	 to	 being	 fully	
operational.	
The	 length	 of	 time	 between	 the	 start	 of	 the	 event	 and	 the	 first	 time	 it	 decreases	 system	
performance	below	the	minimum	functionality	threshold	can	be	termed	the	time-to-failure,	
and	the	period	after	this	until	the	performance	returns	to	an	acceptable	level	is	termed	the	
time-to-recovery.	 For	 a	particular	event,	 the	 time	 interval	 [0,T]	 can	be	partitioned	 into	 the	
time	it	takes	for	the	manufacturer	to:	detect	the	incident;	understand	the	cause;	and	respond	
to	it.	We	can	then	define	the	resilience	to	be	the	integral	of	the	performance	metric	during	
the	event.	
If	no	response	is	made	to	an	incident,	then	the	system	may	reach	a	point	of	catastrophe	at	
time	𝑡 = 𝑡!,	the	time	for	a	threat	to	propagate.	This	could	be	defined	in	multiple	ways,	for	
instance,	it	could	be	seen	as	the	point	where	it	is	no	longer	financially	viable	to	provide	a	fix	
or	where	𝑃 𝑡 	decreases	below	the	minimum	functionality	threshold	for	a	certain	length	of	
time.	For	some	smaller	incidents,	this	may	never	happen	in	which	case	𝑡! = ∞.	
For	 complete	 cyber	 resilience,	 a	 significant	 response	must	 have	 been	made	 before	 𝑡 = 𝑡! 	
otherwise	 catastrophe	 will	 occur.	 Assuming	 the	 main	 response	 is	 provided	 close	 to	 time	𝑡 = 𝑇	 at	 the	end	of	 the	 response	 stage,	we	 say	 the	 system	 is	 completely	 cyber	 resilient	 if	𝑇 < 𝑡! 	and	this	can	be	consistently	achieved	for	all	possible	events.	
If	 for	 a	 particular	 event	𝑇 <  𝑡! 	 is	 not	 achieved	 then	we	may	 be	 in	 one	 of	 three	 possible	
cases:	1)	we	have	failed	to	detect	the	event	in	time;	2)	we	have	not	understood	the	problem,	
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and	3)	we	have	understood	the	problem,	but	we	have	not	had	enough	time	to	develop	a	fix	
and	release	it.			
Complete	 cyber	 resilience	 might	 be	 achievable	 for	 closed	 systems,	 but	 for	 autonomous	
vehicles	 this	 is	 unrealistic.	 Instead	 we	 view	 the	 cybersecurity	 challenge	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
reducing	the	probability	a	random	event	leads	to	catastrophe	to	a	level	which	can	jointly	be	
covered	 by	 insurance	 and	 acceptance	 of	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 risk.	 In	 our	 mathematical	
model,	we	need	to	reduce	the	amount	of	loss.	There	are	three	ways	of	doing	this:	
● by	detecting,	understanding	and	responding	quicker;	
● by	increasing	the	performance	metric	during	the	event,	by	improving	or	maintaining	the	
performance	metric	for	smaller	groups	of	vehicles;	or	
● by	increasing	the	frequency	of	updates,	thus	ensuring	the	attacker	needs	to	amend	the	
attack	to	achieve	the	attack	goal.	
5.	CyRes	–	A	dynamic	system	methodology	for	cyber	resilient	CAVs	
CyRes,	 an	 overview	 of	 which	 is	 presented	 in	 Figure	 1,	 presents	 a	 whole-life	 methodology	
focussed	 on	 operation	 but	 also	 covering	 design,	 manufacture,	 deployment	 and	
redevelopment.	At	the	design	stage,	the	standard	systems	engineering	‘V-model’	with	all	its	
concomitant	certainty	may	be	used	for	subsystems	only	where	those	systems	are	bounded,	
known	and	predictable.		Where	this	is	not	the	case	the	design	objective	prior	to	launch	must	
be	to	achieve	coverage	by	instrumenting	the	system	so	that	it	can	be	more	easily	monitored,	
understood	and	adapted	in	operation.	This	ensures	that	it	can	operate	effectively	at	the	rate	
the	 system	metamorphoses	 in	 the	 face	 of	 emergent	 properties	 and	 threats.	 	 The	 rate	 of	
metamorphosis	will	not	permit	continuous	repetition	of	a	conventional	full	life-cycle.	
During	 the	 operation	 phase,	monitoring	 the	 system	 allows	 threats	 to	 be	 detected.	Once	 a	
threat	 has	 been	 detected,	 it	 first	 needs	 to	 be	 understood,	 using	 on-board	 diagnostics,	
potentially	 supported	 by	 off-board	 simulation,	 to	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 threat	 on	 the	
system.	Candidate	responses	can	then	be	simulated	and,	as	appropriate,	deployed.	Through	
the	use	of	a	Central	Intelligence	function,	new	threats,	optimal	outcomes,	and	assessment	of	
the	mitigations	 can	 be	 stored.	 This	 knowledge	 can	 be	 used	 to	 expedite	 the	 process	 in	 the	
future,	supporting	rapid	retrieval	of	known	threats,	scenarios	for	suggested	remediation	and	
the	efficacy	of	these.	
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Figure	1:	The	CyRes	methodology	
CyRes	employs	real	time	cyber	monitoring	to	detect	abnormal	events	occurring	outside	the	
design	limits.	Theorem	proving	can	be	used	to	classify	whether	events	are	within	design	limits	
or	not.	Detection	of	a	threat	may	occur	in	resource-rich	environments	before	the	event,	or	in	
resource-rich	 or	 resource-constrained	 environments	 after	 the	 event.	 Detection	 of	 a	 threat	
post-event	 is	 usually	 through	 signature-based,	 anomaly-based	 or	 specification-based	
methods.	 Through	 monitoring	 the	 system,	 the	 propagation	 of	 known	 threats	 can	 be	
examined.	
Having	 detected	 threats,	 on-board	 diagnostics	 supported	 by	 simulation	 should	 then	 be	
undertaken	 to	 determine	 how	 close	 to	 the	 design	 limit	 future	 operating	 states	 might	
become.	If	a	cyber-attack	on	a	vehicle	is	detected,	it	is	critical	to	understand	the	impact	the	
attack	may	have	on	 the	vehicle	and	 its	environment	 in	order	 to	 take	appropriate	action	 to	
contain	and	mitigate	the	attack.	It	is	particularly	important	to	know	whether	action	needs	to	
be	taken	immediately	-	whether	it	is	necessary	to	bring	the	vehicle	to	the	nearest	garage	on	
the	 day	 or	 within	 a	 week	 -	 or	 whether	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 raise	 this	 issue	 during	 planned	
maintenance.	 On-board	 diagnostics	 and	 simulation	 provide	 this	 understanding.	 Conditions	
that	 would	 result	 in	 failure,	 and	 their	 likelihood	 of	 occurring,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 optimal	
remediation	strategy	for	the	threat,	should	also	be	found	through	simulation.		
Deployment	 involves	 the	 time-critical	 strategic	 execution	 of	 containment	 and	 mitigation	
plans.	The	 system	 is	monitored	 to	ascertain	whether	 it	 is	 responding	as	expected.	 In	 cases	
where	 there	 is	 an	 undesirable	 response,	 the	 deployment	 should	 be	 withdrawn,	 and	 an	
immutable	 log	 of	 all	 decisions,	 actions	 and	 supporting	 evidence	 be	 updated.	 DevOps	
practices	and	container	technologies	(including	orchestration)	allow	unprecedented	rates	of	
system	change	while	maintaining	control	and	oversight	of	the	operational	parameters	of	the	
system.	Uber	employs	such	an	approach,	launching	more	than	a	million	containerised	batch	
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jobs	per	day,	building	5,000	software	items	per	day	and	deploying	thousands	of	microservices	
across	35	clusters5.	
In	electro-mechanical	systems,	each	system	and	platform	is	different	and	consequently	each	
is	expected	to	be	susceptible	to	failure	in	a	different	way	and	at	a	different	time.	As	such,	the	
potential	harm	arising	 from	 failure	occurs	with	 statistical	probability,	one	device	at	a	 time;	
this	principle	forms	the	basis	of	standard	safety	calculations.	In	digital	systems,	an	identified	
fault	could	manifest	in	all	digitally	identical	systems	at	the	same	time,	thereby	giving	rise	to	
global	 catastrophic	 failure.	 That	 is,	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 overall	 system,	 rather	 than	 at	 the	
individual	 device.	 Functionality	 defence	 by	 heterogeneity,	 inspired	 by	 the	 biological	
phenomenon	of	the	human	race	surviving	deadly	viruses	because	of	the	diversity	arising	from	
heterogeneity,	 has	 been	 proposed	 as	 a	 paradigm	 for	 securing	 systems6.	 This	 inspires	 the	
concept	 of	 engineered	 significant	 differences,	 the	 deliberate	 introduction	 of	 significant	
differences	between	systems	and	platforms	from	design	time	to	manufacture	and	operation.	
These	 differences	 are	 imperceptible	 to	 the	 user	 or	 operator	 but	 may	 prevent	 all	 systems	
being	identically	affected	by	cyber-attacks.		
Proactive	updates	are	continuous	software	updates	which	may	be	applied	 in	an	attempt	to	
defend	against	evolving	cyber-attacks.	These	can	be	generated	through	the	simulation	of	the	
systems	 incorporating	known	and	anticipated	attacks.	Currently,	 software	vendors	attempt	
to	distribute	security	patches	 in	advance	of	vulnerability	disclosure	 to	mitigate	 risks	before	
they	become	issues.	CyRes	builds	on	this	common	practice	and	applies	it	to	CAVs,	extended	
through	large-scale	simulation,	formal	methods	and	distributed	threat	monitoring	to	derive	a	
cyber	 course	 of	 action	 (COA)	 to	 respond	 to	 incidents.	 Proactive	 updates	 should	 exploit	
engineered	significant	difference,	and	by	introducing	controlled	software	variability,	malware	
contagion	 can	 be	 contained.	 Since	 software	 updates	 represent	 a	 threat	 in	 their	 own	 right,	
updates	 must	 be	 assured	 to	 come	 from	 a	 trusted	 source	 and	 have	 undergone	 suitable	
validation	and	verification	before	being	deployed.	
6.	Conclusion	
We	have	demonstrated	the	need	for	a	fundamental	change	in	engineering	practices	for	such	
systems	and	commend	the	CyRes	approach	as	a	new	methodology	to	address	this.	
	
	
	
	
                                                
5	Y.	Liu,	“Only	slightly	bent	-	Uber's	Kubernetes	Migration	Journey	for	microservices,”	[Online].	Available:	
https://kccncna19.sched.com/event/Uabh/only-	slightly-bent-ubers-kubernetes-migration-journey-for-
microservices-yunpeng-liu-	uber.		
6	Sharman,	R.,	Rao,	H.R.,	Upadhyaya,	S.,	Khot,	P.,	Manocha,	S.	and	Ganguly,	S.,	2004,	January.	Functionality	defense	
by	heterogeneity:	a	new	paradigm	for	securing	systems.	In	37th	Annual	Hawaii	International	Conference	on	System	
Sciences,	2004.	Proceedings	of	the	(pp.	10-pp).	IEEE.	
